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The financial crisis of 2007-08 has reinforced the view that interbank network linkages are 
crucial to understanding the financial fragility of a country’s banking system. Unlike earlier 
financial crises, the crisis of 2007-08 did not simply involve depositors running to withdraw money 
from their own banks.  Rather, it also involved banks (and some large non-banks) with interbank 
deposits running on other banks holding those deposits. For example, in the U.S., the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers was associated with a $423 billion dollar contraction in the U.S. dollar interbank 
lending market (Gorton 2010), and this in turn pushed other banks to the brink, requiring 
government bailouts (e.g., Morgan Stanley) or led them to be sold off (e.g., Merrill Lynch). 
The traditional view of financial crises as involving a run by bank depositors on their own bank 
has been modeled as a self-fulfilling equilibrium coordination game by Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) where depositor’s beliefs play a pivotal role. The more modern view of financial contagion 
as an equilibrium phenomena arising from the interbank network structure was first proposed by 
Allen and Gale (2000). While the Diamond and Dybvig model involves the behavior of depositors 
in a single bank, Allen and Gale’s model considers the behavior of depositors across many 
interconnected banks. In this paper, we explore the key implication of Allen and Gale’s interbank 
model of financial crises, namely that the network structure matters for the fragility of the banking 
system. We address the importance of network structure for financial fragility using the 
methodology of experimental economics, which provides us with precise control over the network 
structure of interbank connections as well as over the information that is available to depositors in 
that network. This control enables us to gather data that can be used to directly test the role played 
by network structure in the spread of a financial crisis. While there are many experimental studies 
of the Diamond and Dybvig model of bank runs, our paper provides the first experimental test of 
whether the interbank network structure matters for the likelihood of financial contagion. In 
addition, we also consider the role played by premature liquidation costs for the susceptibility of 
the financial system to a contagion and the interaction of liquidation costs with network structure. 
As the size of the liquidation costs affects the rate of return that bank depositors get in the event 
that their bank goes bankrupt, higher liquidation costs (a low liquidation rate) can make the 
interbank system more fragile and susceptible to panic. Network structure might play a role in 
mitigating such risks and that is why we consider the interaction between different liquidation rates 
and different interbank network structures in our experiment. 
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In the experiment, subjects are depositors in their local regional bank. As in the Allen and Gale 
model, this regional bank is one of four interconnected banks in the economy. Each bank holds 
deposits with other banks as a means of insuring against the uncertain liquidity demands of their 
depositors. Following Allen and Gale (2000), we focus on two different interbank market 
structures, namely, an “incomplete” market structure where the banks are partially connected (i.e., 
each bank holds deposits in one adjacent bank) and a “complete” market structure, where the four 
banks are fully connected (i.e., each bank invests a fraction of their deposits in each one of the 
other three banks). According to the model, as detailed in Section 2, the introduction of interbank 
linkages (i.e., exchange of deposits) implies that, in the absence of exogenous liquidity shocks, 
both market structures can implement the first-best (i.e, no bank run equilibrium). However, if 
there are liquidity shocks, then the interbank market structure can matter for whether the first-best 
equilibrium is attainable. Specifically, when there are liquidity shocks, if banks’ liquidation rate 
on long-term investments is sufficiently high, both market structures can continue to implement 
the first-best equilibrium. However, when there are liquidity shocks and a sufficiently low 
liquidation rate, the first-best can only be attained under the complete market structure; under the 
incomplete market structure there is a unique “contagion equilibrium” involving runs on all banks 
in the network.  
Our experiment was designed to test the implications of such fragility and for this reason, in 
every round we introduce a liquidity shock to one of the four banks in the economy. Depositors’ 
payoffs are carefully calibrated to capture the model assumptions. The result is a risk-sharing 
coordination game where there is a unique Nash equilibrium involving full contagion when the 
interbank network is incomplete and the liquidation rate is sufficiently low. By contrast, when the 
interbank network structure is complete or when the liquidation rate is sufficiently high, both the 
inefficient and efficient equilibrium coexist allowing for the possibility of either the full contagion 
or no-contagion equilibria, respectively. We implement a 2x2 between-subjects experimental 
design, combining each ‘network structure’ and two levels of liquidation rate (low and high). 
Participants played 30 rounds of a game in which they were repeatedly confronted with the choice 
of withdrawing or keeping their deposits with their local regional bank. Our main research 
objective is to understand whether a more integrated banking system leads to smaller self-fulfilling 
spillover effects, as predicted by the model.  
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To preview our findings, our main experimental result is that, when liquidation costs are high 
so that the return in prematurely liquidated assets --“the liquidation rate”-- is low, and the interbank 
network structure is incomplete, we find that all of the economies converge to an outcome 
approximating the full-contagion equilibrium, which is the unique equilibrium outcome in that 
setting.  By contrast, if the network structure is complete and if the liquidation rate remains low, 
then there are multiple pure strategy equilibria: full contagion and the more efficient equilibrium 
where the bank run is limited to the adversely affected bank only. In that setting we find that about 
one-half of our experimental economies achieve the full contagion equilibrium while the other half 
achieve the efficient risk-sharing equilibrium outcome where the crisis is limited to the bank facing 
the adverse shock. Econometric analysis confirms that the probability of a participant withdrawing 
her deposit in the low liquidation rate treatment is significantly larger under the incomplete 
network structure than under the complete one, even after controlling for the past behaviour of co-
players and own past behaviour. Moreover, in the incomplete network structure, we also observe 
the expected pattern of contagion, where there is a spillover from the shocked bank to the bank 
directly connected with that bank and then on to the next connected bank until finally the full 
banking network is affected. Therefore, our results provide support for the model’s prediction that 
in an incomplete interbank network structure, an initial financial shock spreads to all banks and 
the crisis becomes global.  
When the liquidation rate is high (that is, when liquidation costs are low), both the full-
contagion and no contagion (local-only crisis) outcomes are equilibria under both the complete 
and incomplete network structures. In this case, we find that our experimental economies generally 
coordinate on the efficient equilibrium where the crisis is limited to the adversely affected bank. 
That is, when liquidation rates are high, network structure does not play a role in reducing the 
frequency of contagions. We conclude from these findings that high liquidation rates (low 
premature liquidation costs) or more complete interbank network structures may be substitutes for 
one another in reducing the likelihood of financial contagions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section situates our paper in the relevant 
literature. Section 2 presents the model and the main hypotheses concerning the consequences of 
network structure for financial contagion. Section 3 describes our experimental design and Section 
4 presents our experimental results as a number of different findings. Section 5 provides a summary 






To date, the experimental literature on bank runs has primarily focused on the behavior of 
depositors in a single bank following the set-up of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). 1  These 
experimental papers have typically focused on the coordination game aspect of that model, asking 
subjects whether they wish to keep their deposits in the single bank or to withdraw those funds.  
As in Diamond and Dybvig’s model, early withdrawal can be a (self-fulfilling) best response if 
depositors believe that a sufficient number of other depositors will withdraw early.  In particular, 
Madiès (2006) investigates the possibility and the degree of persistence of self-fulfilling banking 
panics and shows that those phenomena are both persistent and difficult to prevent. When looking 
at alternative ways to prevent those type of crises, Madiès’s results suggest that a suspension of 
payment (i.e., more time to think before making a withdrawal decision) is more efficient than 
partial deposit insurance. Garratt and Keister (2009) show that the frequency of bank runs increases 
with (1) uncertainty about the aggregate liquidity demand, and (2) the number of opportunities 
subjects have to withdraw. Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) demonstrate that bank runs can be 
mitigated by the presence of insiders (i.e., depositors who have no uncertainty about the quality of 
the bank). Arifovic et al. (2013) show that the occurrence of bank runs depends on a coordination 
parameter, which measures the fraction of depositors that are required to wait so that they can earn 
a higher payoff than those who withdraw. Their results point towards the existence of three 
different zones, where bank runs are (i) rare when the parameter is low; (ii) frequent when the 
parameter is high; (iii) indeterminate and dependent on the history of the game for intermediate 
values of the coordination parameter. Finally, Kiss et al. (2012, 2014) study how the observability 
of the withdrawal decisions of other depositors (simultaneous or sequential) interacted with the 
amount of deposit insurance affects the incidence of bank runs. They find that greater deposit 
insurance and observability of withdrawal decisions in a sequential (as opposed to simultaneous) 
order both work to reduce the likelihood of a bank run and that certain sequential information 
structures can even prevent bank runs from occurring if depositors are sufficiently patient. 
Two papers have used a 2-bank model to explore contagion issues, Brown et al. (2017) and 
Chakravarty et al. (2015). In both studies, depositors in one bank make their decisions first and the 
6 
 
depositors in the second bank observe the decisions of depositors in the first bank before acting. 
Moreover, the banks’ liquidity needs are either linked or independent and this is common 
knowledge to all depositors in Brown et al. (2017), whereas it is only known to the depositors of 
the first bank in Chakravarty et al. (2015).2  While in Brown et al. (2017) contagion occurs only 
when the banks have economic linkages, in Chakravarty et al. (2015) the depositors’ actions in the 
first bank significantly affect the behavior of depositors in the second bank even when the banks’ 
liquidities are independent. While these papers study interbank linkages, with just two banks, the 
network structure cannot play much of a role.  None of these papers consider variations in the 
interbank network structure for efficient risk sharing and the susceptibility of the banking system 
to financial crises which is the main contribution of this paper.3 Indeed, Chakravarty et al. (2015, 
p. 50) conclude by suggesting that for future experimental research on financial crises “there is 
value not only in reinforcing banking inter-linkages for their value in diversifying risk (as in Allen 
and Gale, 2000) but also in making those linkages common knowledge”. This is precisely the 
approach that we take in this paper. 
 
2. MODEL  
 
2.1 The Environment 
 
The model we adopt is based on the intertemporal model of Allen and Gale (2000). There are 
three dates, 𝑡𝑡 = 0, 1, 2 and four regions. Each of the four regions is served by a local regional bank 
labeled A, B, C and D. Each region/bank has a continuum of ex-ante identical depositors who have 
an endowment of one unit of the consumption good at date 0 and nothing for the other two dates. 
These depositors have preferences as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983); they get utility from 
consumption only in date 1 (2) with probability 𝑤𝑤 (1 − 𝑤𝑤). 
𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐1, 𝑐𝑐2) = �
𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐1)  with probability 𝑤𝑤
 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐2)  with probability   1 − 𝑤𝑤
 
Each bank can invest the deposits of its customers in one of two assets. The liquid (or short) 
asset acts as storage technology. For each unit of deposits invested in the liquid asset at date 𝑡𝑡, this 
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short-term asset yields a return of 1 at date 𝑡𝑡 + 1.  The second, illiquid (or long) asset takes two 
periods to mature, but yields a higher payoff of 𝑅𝑅 > 1 per unit invested; if investments made in 
this long asset have to be liquidated early, i.e., at date 1 rather than at date 2, the liquidation return 
per unit of the asset is given by 𝑟𝑟, where 0 < 𝑟𝑟 < 1. We associate high (low) liquidation costs with 
low (high) liquidation rates, where the latter are the values for 𝑟𝑟. 
The regions differ in the likelihood that consumers are impatient (early) withdrawers or patient 
(late) withdrawers. Let 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 denote the probability of early withdrawers in region i, and assume that 
there are just two possible values for 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 (low or high): 0 < 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 < 𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 < 1.  Assume further that 
there are two equally likely states of the world, 𝑆𝑆1 and 𝑆𝑆2, and that the realizations of the liquidity 
shocks across the four regions and two states are common knowledge and as given in Table 1: 
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
The timing of moves is as follows. At date 0, all depositors deposit their endowment in their 
regional bank and these banks invest these deposits in the two assets.  At date 1, state and depositor 
uncertainty is resolved; the state of the world is revealed and each depositor’s liquidity type is 
made known according to the probabilities given in Table 1. However, the banks are not able to 
observe a depositor’s type, so it is possible that late (patient) depositors mimic early (impatient) 
depositors by also withdrawing their deposits early.  
 
2.2  The Optimal Risk Sharing Contract 
 
The contract that banks in each region offer their depositors at date 0 can be characterized as 
the solution to a planner’s problem that implements the efficient (first-best) solution without the 
need to verify depositors’ types. This solution is achievable only if the planner is able to transfer 
resources across banks in different states of the world. Allen and Gale (2000) further demonstrate 
that this optimal solution can also be decentralized by the banks themselves through their use of 
the interbank deposit market to insure against uncertain liquidity needs in their own bank/region. 
Specifically, in this decentralized setting (which is the environment we study in the laboratory), 
the optimal contract that each bank offers to its depositors pays 𝑐𝑐1 = 1 units of consumption to 
those withdrawing at date 1 and 𝑐𝑐2 = 𝑅𝑅 units of consumption to those withdrawing at date 2. Each 
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bank knows that the aggregate demand for liquidity is the same in each state and they also know 
the average fraction of impatient depositors across all four banks, 𝛾𝛾 = 𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻+𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿
2
. Thus, each bank 
invests a fraction 𝛾𝛾 of deposits in the short asset and a fraction 1 − 𝛾𝛾 of deposits in the long asset 
at date 0, as it is efficient to pay early withdrawers with the short asset and late withdrawers with 
the long asset. 
The optimal risk sharing arrangement is implemented by transfers of resources that banks hold 
at other banks. For example, if the state of the world 𝑆𝑆1 occurs, then each bank has 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐1 units of the 
short asset and needs to pay 𝑐𝑐1 to each impatient depositor at 𝑡𝑡 = 1. Banks A and C have excess 
demand for the short asset in the amount (𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑐𝑐1 , while Banks B and D have an excess supply 
of the short asset in the amount (𝛾𝛾 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿)𝑐𝑐1 = (𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑐𝑐1. Thus at date 1, it is possible to satisfy 
the excess demand of banks A and C if banks B and D transfer their excess supply of the short 
asset while at date 2, the opposite transfer flow has to take place from banks A and C to banks B 
and D to satisfy the excess demand in that period.  These transfers can be implemented by an 
appropriate allocation of interbank deposits across the four regions. However, the precise amount 
of these interbank deposits will depend on the network structure of the banking system. 
 
2.3 The Importance of Network Structure 
 
With four banks, there are several possible symmetric network structures for interbank 
linkages, but we choose to focus on the two that are illustrated in Figure 1, as they capture the 
essential insights about the importance of network structure for financial contagion and they 
involve network connections among all four banks/regions in the economy.  While there are also 
asymmetric, (e.g., “star”) network structures, we focus here on symmetric network configurations 
for the banking system as these are easier to explain to experimental subjects and such networks 
do not involve payoff asymmetries that may trigger inequity (fairness) concerns. 
[Insert Figure 1 here.] 
In the incomplete network illustrated in Figure 1, bank A places deposits with bank B; bank B 
places deposits with bank C; bank C places deposits with bank D; and bank D places deposits with 
Bank A. In line with our experimental instructions, a bank is said to be connected to another bank 
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when it has placed a deposit in that bank. In this incomplete network configuration, Allen and Gale 
(2000) show that the first-best can be achieved if, at date 0, each bank places  (𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝛾𝛾) of its 
deposits in the other bank with which it connected. By contrast, under the complete network 
structure depicted in Figure 1, each bank can place deposits with any of the other three banks.  In 
this case, given the liquidity shock structure of Table 1, each bank’s liquidity needs are negatively 
correlated with two of the other three banks (i.e., a bank with low liquidity needs is connected with 
two high liquidity need banks and one other low liquidity need bank, while a high liquidity need 
bank is connected with two low liquidity need banks and the other high liquidity bank).  It follows 
that the first-best solution can be implemented by having each bank, at date 0, place  (𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝛾𝛾)/2 
of its deposits in each of the other three banks 4.  
The main difference between these two network structures is their susceptibility to what Allen 
and Gale term a “zero probability at date 0” perturbation. Specifically, suppose there is a state 𝑆𝑆̅ 
such that the fraction of impatient depositors in (say) bank/region A is 𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀, while it remains 
equal to γ in the other 3 regions as summarized in Table 2. Thus, in a perturbed state, the average 
liquidity demands across the four regions are higher than in the normal states 𝑆𝑆1or 𝑆𝑆2 . As this 
perturbed state is not known in advance, the continuation equilibrium is different from the normal 
state and depends on the network structure. The occurrence of this state leads the aggregate demand 
for liquidity to be greater than the system’s ability to supply liquidity, and therefore to the 
possibility of a global crisis. Importantly, given the zero probability attributed to that state, banks 
don’t change their investment portfolio. 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
In essence, in this state, there are three possible outcomes for Bank A. In the first case, it can 
meet its excess liquidity demands by drawing upon its deposits with other banks and remain 
solvent. In a second case it can become insolvent, if after withdrawing its deposits from other 
banks, it must also liquidate some of its position in the long-term asset. Finally, a third possibility 
is that Bank A cannot meet its liquidity needs even by fully liquidating all of its long-term asset 
position and must declare bankruptcy.  In the theory of Allen and Gale, the complete network 
structure is the one that is least susceptible to the last two outcomes, insolvency or bankruptcy, 
while less connected network structures are more susceptible to these outcomes. Our experiment 
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is designed to test this implication of the theory.  Specifically, we have the following two testable 
hypotheses (which depend on the parameterization of the model). 
First, if the interbank market is incomplete, the bank facing the liquidity shock (Bank A) will 
go bankrupt and the crisis can spread to the other interconnected banks. Specifically, these 
interconnected banks can also become bankrupt if the liquidation rate, 𝑟𝑟 , is small enough, a 
parameter we vary in our experiment.  In a similar manner, the crisis then spreads to the whole 
system. So, if the interbank market is incomplete, and 𝑟𝑟 is sufficiently low, a run on one bank 
spreads via a contagion to all other banks and leads to an economy wide financial crisis. On the 
other hand, if 𝑟𝑟  is sufficiently large, then even under an incomplete network structure it is possible 
to sustain the first-best outcome where the crisis is limited to the one bank facing the liquidity 
shock (Bank A); in this case both the first-best and the full contagion outcome are equilibrium 
possibilities. 
Second, if the interbank market is complete, the initial impact of a financial shock in one bank 
may be mitigated if every bank takes a small hit (that is, if every bank liquidates some of the long 
asset). This possibility exists regardless of the value of the liquidation rate, 0 < 𝑟𝑟 < 1.  Of course 
it is also possible that depositors refuse to accept such losses (and choose to withdraw early) 
igniting a contagious wave of bankruptcies in the complete network setting as well.  However, the 
possibility that the crisis is localized to the shocked bank (A) is always an equilibrium scenario 
(for any 𝑟𝑟 ) under the complete network structure and that is the main difference with the 
incomplete network structure that we wish to test with our experimental design. 
 
2.4  Payoffs 
 
Following Allen and Gale (2000), impatient depositors withdrawing at date 1 do not earn any 
interest on their deposits and are therefore promised a return exactly equal to the amount initially 
deposited at their bank. On the other hand, patient depositors are promised a return of 𝑅𝑅 at date 2. 
However, due to the financial perturbation and possible contagion, some or all banks will need to 
liquidate part or all of their long-term asset. Given that this is done at a liquidation rate of 0 < 𝑟𝑟 <
1, those banks will be unable to pay back, either patient, impatient, or both type of depositors, their 
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promised returns. In those situations, the payoffs are equal to the ratio of the total asset value of 
the bank divided by the number of withdrawers (including both depositors and connected banks). 
Let 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 represent the value of a deposit in bank 𝑖𝑖 at 𝑡𝑡 = 1. If  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 is less than the promised return 
in date 1 (i.e., 𝑐𝑐1), then, regardless of whether the withdrawer is another bank or a consumer, they 
will each get 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 from the bank for each unit invested at 𝑡𝑡 = 0. Given the nature of the interbank 
network structures, this requires all 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 values to be determined simultaneously.  
Consider for instance the Incomplete Network Structure. Assume that all depositors of Bank A 
withdraw at 𝑡𝑡 = 1, so that the total demand is 𝑛𝑛 + 𝑧𝑧, where 𝑛𝑛 is the number of withdrawers and 
each deposited one unit at  𝑡𝑡 = 0 and 𝑧𝑧 is the deposit that Bank D holds in Bank A. The liabilities 
of Bank A are then valued at: 
(𝑛𝑛 + 𝑧𝑧)𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 (1) 
The assets of Bank A are the y units it invested in the short asset, the x units it invested in the long 
asset that will be prematurely liquidated at rate,  𝑟𝑟, and the amount z of deposits that Bank A has 
with Bank B. Therefore, Bank A’s assets value is given by: 
 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 (2) 





A similar equation will hold for any Bank i in which qi is less than the promised return in period 
1.  
This equation can be used so long as 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 is equal to the promised return, 𝑐𝑐1. If 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 < 𝑐𝑐1, then the 
equivalent equation is needed to estimate 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵, which will depend on the value of 𝑞𝑞𝐶𝐶; and so on. 
Similarly, for the Complete Market Structure, assume that all depositors of Bank A withdraw 
at 𝑡𝑡 = 1, so that the total demand is 𝑛𝑛 + 3𝑧𝑧, where 𝑛𝑛 is the number of Bank A customers who each 
deposited one unit at  𝑡𝑡 = 0 and 𝑧𝑧 is the amount deposited in Bank A by each of Banks B, C, and 
D. The liabilities of Bank A are then valued at: 
12 
 
(𝑛𝑛 + 3𝑧𝑧)𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 (4) 
The assets of Bank A are again the y units it invested in the short asset, the x units invested in the 
long asset that will be prematurely liquidated at rate, r, and the amount z that Bank A deposited in 
each of Bank B, C, and D. Therefore, the assets value is given by: 
 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝑧𝑧(𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 + 𝑞𝑞𝐶𝐶 + 𝑞𝑞𝐷𝐷) (5) 





A similar equation will hold for any Bank i in which qi is less than the promised return in period 
1.  
This equation can be used as long as 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵, 𝑞𝑞𝐶𝐶, and 𝑞𝑞𝐷𝐷  are equal to the promised return, 𝑐𝑐1. If 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 <
𝑐𝑐1, and/or 𝑞𝑞𝐶𝐶 < 𝑐𝑐1, and/or 𝑞𝑞𝐷𝐷 < 𝑐𝑐1, then the equivalent equation is needed to estimate 𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵and/or 
𝑞𝑞𝐶𝐶 and/or 𝑞𝑞𝐷𝐷, which will depend on the value of all deposits at 𝑡𝑡 = 1 in the banks with whom they 
are connected. 
As detailed in the next section, we present these different payoff calculations to depositors in 
the three banks as payoff tables that depend on the liquidation rate, 𝑟𝑟, and the network structure. 
 
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
 
3.1 Design and Hypotheses 
 
In our experimental setting, as in the theory, there are four banks labelled A, B, C and D.  Each 
participant in our experiment is assigned the role of a depositor in one of the four banks. The 
experimental setting and payoffs is set up based on 4 depositors in each bank. 
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We set the probability that a depositor is impatient in a bank that faces a low or high liquidity 
shock to 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 = 1/4 and 𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 = 3/4, respectively. Thus, the average fraction of impatient depositors 












= 0.5. Therefore, from Table 2 it follows that, in the perturbed 
state 𝑆𝑆̅, among the banks that do not face the liquidity shock, the number of impatient depositors 
is equal to  4 ∗ 𝛾𝛾 = 2 ,  while in the bank that faces the liquidity shock this number is equal to 4 ∗
(𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀) = 3. 
The banks’ use deposits to make investment choices that are pre-determined according to the 
network structure and the parameterization of the model. Since the average fraction of impatient 
withdrawers in the economy is 0.5, the banks invest a fraction 𝛾𝛾 = 0.5 of deposits in the short asset 
and a fraction 1 − 𝛾𝛾 = 0.5 in the long asset. As previously mentioned, Allen and Gale (2000) 








  and (𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝛾𝛾)/2 =
1
8
 of its deposits in each of the bank(s) with which they are connected in 
the incomplete and complete market structures, respectively, and so the payoff incentives of our 
experiment take these investment choices as given. That is, the interbank deposits are made 
according to the first-best risk sharing outcome.   
As for the other parameters of the model, we set 𝑅𝑅 = 2 and we chose two different values for 
𝑟𝑟: 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2, a low liquidation rate (associated with high liquidation costs) and 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4, a high 
liquidation rate (associated with low liquidation costs). Given these parameter choices, we can 
simultaneously solve for 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖, (as detailed in the previous section) which is the value of all deposits 
in bank i at 𝑡𝑡 = 1, and determine the payoffs offered to depositors when banks are illiquid (i.e., 
they are unable to pay the promised return) or bankrupt.  The parameter choices are such that when 
𝑟𝑟 = 0.2, the first-best, contagion free outcome is an equilibrium in the complete network setting, 
but not in the incomplete network setting where a full contagion is the unique equilibrium outcome. 
By contrast, when 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4 the first-best, contagion-free outcome is also an equilibrium under the 
incomplete network structure. Of course, the full contagion outcome is always an equilibrium for 
any value of 𝑟𝑟  or for either network structure.  
Summarizing, we employ a 2 × 2  between-subjects experimental design where the two 
treatment variables are (1) the network structure, complete or incomplete as illustrated in Figure 
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1, and (2) the liquidation rate, 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 (low) or 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4 (high). The design and the equilibria that 
are possible in each of the four treatment cells of our experiment are summarized in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
While the experimental setting and payoffs are established on the basis of 4 depositors in each 
bank or 16 depositors for the total economy, our primary focus is the behaviour of the ‘strategic’ 
players, namely, the patient depositors who can choose whether or not to withdraw early, that is, 
in period 1; the impatient depositors just mechanically withdraw early and so are of little 
behavioural interest. Therefore, we parameterized our experiment in such a way that human 
subjects are only needed to play the role of the patient depositors in all four banks. That is, in our 
experiment, each economy consists of just 8 (rather than 16) human subject depositors, 2 subjects 
for each bank. Effectively, the actions that would be taken by the early withdrawers are built into 
the payoff tables that the two strategic players at each bank have to consider.  
In addition, one of the “patient” human subject depositors was randomly subjected to the 
perturbed shock and forced to withdraw early at date 1 in each repetition of the game.  To further 
simplify the experimental setting, the financial fragility shock always originates with bank A; that 
is, one of the two “patient” depositors in Bank A is randomly forced to withdraw early at date 1, 
in each repetition (round) of the three period game, while the other human subject at Bank A was 
free to withdraw at date 1 or at date 2 (as was also the case for the 6 other human subject players 
at Banks, B, C and D.  
An experimental observation consists of the play of 30 rounds by the same 8 subjects 
representing a single economy under one of the four treatment conditions. At the beginning of each 
round, pairs of subjects are randomly assigned to 1 of the 4 banks. We chose to keep subjects in 
the same cohort of 8 players to better allow for learning behavior. The random assignment of 
players to banks at the start of each round was chosen to avoid having the same subjects be 
repeatedly exposed to the liquidity shock in Bank A.   
Specifically, at date  𝑡𝑡 = 0, each randomly formed pair or “group” is assigned to a bank and 
learns which bank it is, A, B, C or D.  We used the terminology “group” to refer to the 2 subjects 
assigned to each of the 4 banks. Next, subjects deposit their endowment of 100 experimental 
pounds (EP) in their bank.5 Then, at date 𝑡𝑡 = 1, depositors in bank A learn whether or not they are 
the impatient depositor, and thus the one who is forced to withdraw their deposit at date 1. All 
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other 7 patient depositors have to make a single decision: whether to withdraw their deposit in 𝑡𝑡 =
1 or wait until 𝑡𝑡 = 2 (not withdraw). Participants have full information about the perturbation 
shock, that is, that the shocked bank is always bank A and to which bank they are assigned in each 
round.  After all decisions are made (i.e., withdraw or not withdraw), each participant learns the 
outcome of their decision (round earnings), the decision of the group-mate and the aggregated 
decisions of the depositors in the connected banks. A history table summarizing this information 
for previous rounds is also presented. Round earnings are in EP. At the end of the experiment, one 
round is randomly selected for payment.  
Round earnings depend on the network structure. We implement each network structure and 
liquidation rate  𝑟𝑟 as a separate between-subjects treatment. In each treatment, subjects are 
informed of the network linkages and the payoff consequences from choices by their own bank 
members and others via the interbank network connections. In our setup, there are 54 possible 
combinations of withdrawal requests. To ease presentation, the payoff tables were created by 
grouping the combinations according to the choice of the person in the same bank (group-mate) 
and the number of withdrawal requests in the connected banks and taking the median of the 
payoffs for each grouping, as shown on Tables 4-7 below.6 For the incomplete network structure, 
the payoff tables for patient depositors are shown in Tables 4 and 5.  
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 here] 
In both Tables 4-5, the player’s own choice, to Not Withdraw (N) or to Withdraw (W) is 
indicated in the left column and the choice of the group-mate (in the same bank) is indicated in the 
top row of the two right columns. The two right columns are further sub-divided up according to 
the choices made by the two depositors in the connected bank - the other bank holding deposits of 
the bank the two players are in.  Here, N means no (0) Withdraw choices by depositors in the 
connected bank, while 1W and 2W mean 1 or 2 withdrawals, respectively by the depositors in the 
connected bank. Recall that initially all subjects deposit 100 EP in the bank, so the payoff numbers 
indicate the additional EP from the various actions. Thus, for both incomplete network treatments, 
if the group-mate does not withdraw, choosing N, and there are not any withdrawals in the 
connected bank, N (a possibility so long as the connected bank is not Bank A), then, the players 
would gain 100 EP from choosing N (not withdraw) reflecting our choice of 𝑅𝑅 = 2 (i.e., their 
initial deposit of 100 EP is doubled). In this same scenario, in the low liquidation rate treatment, 
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the player would lose 15 EP if she instead chose to withdraw W for a net payoff of 85 EP, while 
in the high liquidation rate treatment she would lose only 5 EP if she instead chose to withdraw W 
for a net payoff of 95 EP; these differences reflect the two different values for the liquidation rate, 
 𝑟𝑟.  Notice that losses are always capped at -100, resulting in a net payoff of 0 (given the initial 
endowment of 100 EP).  Notice further that if a player’s group-mate withdraws, it is always a 
dominant strategy for the player to withdraw as well under both incomplete network treatments.  
Finally, consider the case of Bank A, where one depositor is forced to withdraw. His patient-type 
group mate, knowing that he is in Bank A and facing the payoff table above should play a best 
response of withdrawing as well in both treatments. Since there will (rationally) be two 
withdrawals (2W) in Bank A, members of the bank connected to (with deposits in) Bank A, i.e., 
Bank D depositors, in the incomplete network structure, should rationally anticipate that they will 
face 2W in the connected bank, in which case the dominant strategy for both players in Bank D 
depends on the value of 𝑟𝑟. If 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2, Table 4 reveals that the two depositors in Bank D facing 2W 
from Bank A have a dominant strategy of choosing W. Then, recognizing that the two players in 
Bank D will play 2W, the two players in Bank C should also play W, and, recognizing this 
outcome, the two players in Bank B will also play W, making the financial contagion complete. 
Thus, for the incomplete market structure with 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2, we find, via backward induction, that the 
unique equilibrium involves a full contagion (FC) outcome where all 8 depositors choose W. By 
contrast, if 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4, Table 5 reveals that the two depositors in Bank D facing 2W from Bank A do 
not have a dominant strategy; if each believes the other will play N, then N is a best response, 
while W remains a best response to the belief that the group-mate will play W. Applying a 
generalization of risk dominance to our n-player, binary choice game (a flat prior assumption about 
outcomes in connected banks) it can be shown that when 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 , the financial contagion 
equilibrium is both risk and payoff dominant. When  𝑟𝑟 = 0.4, the full contagion equilibrium 
remains risk dominant but the payoff dominant (first-best) equilibrium is the outcome where 
bankruptcy is limited to Bank A.  
In making predictions as to how subjects will behave, we shall assume that payoff efficiency 
is the relevant equilibrium selection criterion. This assumption enables us to make unique 
predictions for all of our treatments. In addition, there is experimental evidence from a variety of 
two-player, Pareto-ranked coordination games that payoff efficiency is the most commonly used 
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equilibrium selection principle (as opposed to, say, risk dominance)-see Rankin et al. (2000).  
Under this maintained assumption, we have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: In the INCOMPLETE network structure with a low liquidation rate (𝑟𝑟 = 0.2), the 
original financial shock spreads to all banks as one after the other faces bankruptcy. With a high 
liquidation rate (𝑟𝑟 = 0.4), players recognize that the contagion can be avoided and coordinate on 
the first-best equilibrium with bankruptcy limited to Bank A. 
For the complete network structure, the payoff tables for patient depositors are shown in Tables 
6 and 7. These payoff tables are read similarly to the payoff tables for the incomplete network 
treatments, but now the possible actions of players in the connected banks is greater, as there are 
three connected banks in the complete network as opposed to just one in the incomplete network 
and so anywhere from 0 to 6 players can choose to withdraw among these three connected banks. 
Of course, 0W by depositors of other connected banks is only a possible outcome for members of 
Bank A, and this fact was made clear in the instructions. 
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 here] 
Consider first the payoffs to depositors in the low liquidation rate 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 treatment, as shown 
in Table 6. In this treatment, conditional on one’s group-mate not withdrawing (i.e., choosing N), 
it is a best response for the player not to withdraw so long as the number of withdrawals by players 
in connected banks does not exceed 3W. Since for banks B-D, the number of withdrawals in 
connected banks can rationally be expected to be, at a minimum, 2 - namely the two players in 
Bank A - the efficient (first-best) equilibrium is for no members of Banks B-D to choose withdraw 
early (all 6 choose N) and as a result all players in Banks B-D earn 25 EP on top of their 100 EP 
investment (since the two players in Bank A play 2W).  On the other hand, if players believe that 
all other depositors will choose to withdraw, then it is an equilibrium best response for all players 
to withdraw as well, so that the inefficient financial contagion equilibrium also exists in this 
complete network setting. The same multiplicity of equilibria holds in the 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4 treatment as can 
be seen by the payoffs in Table 7, but the incentives to not withdraw and coordinate on the efficient 
first-best equilibrium are greater in this case. Specifically, conditional on one’s group-mate not 
withdrawing (i.e., choosing N), it is a best response for the player not to withdraw for any number 
of withdrawals (0-6W) by members of connected banks. The full contagion equilibrium is obtained 
only if all players believe that their group-mate will withdraw. 
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For the complete network under both values for 𝑟𝑟, the full contagion equilibrium is again risk 
dominant while the efficient risk sharing equilibrium, where only Bank A goes bankrupt, is payoff 
dominant.  Again, assuming that payoff efficiency is the relevant equilibrium selection criterion, 
we have the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: In the COMPLETE network, depositors coordinate on the efficient, risk sharing 
outcome where only the bank facing the financial shock goes bankrupt regardless of the value of 
 𝑟𝑟. 
Hypothesis 3: A high liquidation rate 𝑟𝑟 acts as a substitute for completeness of the interbank 
network structure. 
The latter hypothesis will be tested by comparing withdrawal decisions in the incomplete 
network treatment when 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2  and 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4  and comparing these outcomes with complete 




The experiment was computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were students at 
the University of East Anglia.  No subject had any prior experience with our experimental design 
and subjects were only allowed to participate in a single session/treatment of our experiment. We 
obtained 11 observations on choices by 8-subject cohorts for each of our four treatment conditions. 
Thus, our study involved a total of 4 × 11 × 8 = 352 subjects (average age = 21.3 years; 57.7% 
females). 
Each experimental session began with subjects being given written instructions which were 
then read aloud in an effort to make those instructions common knowledge (copies of these written 
instructions are included in the Appendix). After the instructions were read, subjects had to answer 
a number of questions designed to check their comprehension of those instructions. Subjects who 
made mistakes were instructed as to the correct answers prior to the first round of the game. 
After completing 30 rounds, subjects were informed as to which round was randomly selected 
for payment and their payoff for that round. Earnings in EP were converted into British Pounds at 
the known exchange rate of 1 EP = 0.1 British Pounds. In addition, subjects received a 3 British 
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pounds show-up payment. Between the end of the experiment and the payment phase, a 
demographics and feedback questionnaire was administered. Participants received their payment 
in cash at the end of the session. 
Each session was completed within 1 hour (50 minutes on average) and 2 or 3 eight-player 
cohorts (16 – 24 subjects) participated in a single session. The average payment was 8.96 British 
Pounds (SD 2.96 British Pounds) in the incomplete network with low liquidation rate treatment; 
9.65 British Pounds (SD 4.47 British Pounds) in the complete network with low liquidation rate 
treatment; 15.36 British Pounds (SD 6.89 British Pounds) in the incomplete network with high 
liquidation rate treatment and 15.32 British Pounds (SD 6.33 British Pounds) in the complete 




4.1 Bankruptcies and Withdrawals 
 
We report the results of our experiment as a number of different findings. We begin with an 
aggregate analysis of the main differences across the four treatments before moving on to the more 
micro-level differences.  
Finding 1: Consistent with Hypothesis 1, under the INCOMPLETE network with a low liquidation 
rate 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2, the original financial shock frequently spreads to the other three banks, which then 
face bankruptcy. With a high liquidation rate, 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4 , players frequently learn to avoid the 
contagion and coordinate on the first-best equilibrium where bankruptcy is limited to Bank A. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Support for Finding 1 comes from Figure 2 which shows the average number of banks other 
than Bank A experiencing bankruptcy in each of the 30 rounds for all four of our treatments. Here 
bankruptcy is defined as an inability to meet the payment promises made to depositors choosing 
to withdraw at  𝑡𝑡 = 1 . The average number of bankrupted banks over time in the incomplete 
network treatments is shown by the two dashed lines, labelled I-0.2 and I-0.4, for the incomplete 
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network,  𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 and 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4 treatments, respectively. As Figure 2 clearly reveals, over time, the 
number of bankrupted banks other than bank A averages around 2.5 in the Incomplete, 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 
treatment and this same average approaches 0.5 over time in the Incomplete 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4  treatment. 
Further support for Finding 1 comes from Figures 3-4. In particular, Figures 3-4 shows the 
number of bankrupt banks over time disaggregated by each of the eleven 8-player cohorts in the 
Incomplete 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2  and Incomplete, 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4 treatments, respectively. As Figure 3 reveals, the 
number of bankrupted banks in the Incomplete 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 treatment was typically between 2 and 3, 
so that the financial contagion was not always perfectly complete (to all 3 banks) in that treatment. 
On the other hand, Figure 4 displays what appears to be a mirror image of Figure 3, with the 
number of bankrupted banks being typically between 0 and 1 for the Incomplete,  𝑟𝑟 = 0.4 
treatment. As such, the efficient first-best equilibrium (where 0 banks other than bank A go 
bankrupt) was not always reached in this treatment. Nevertheless, the evidence clearly suggests 
that the full contagion equilibrium is the more likely outcome in the Incomplete, 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 
treatment, while the efficient first-best equilibrium is the more likely outcome in the Incomplete, 
𝑟𝑟 = 0.4 treatment. 
[Insert Figures 3-4 here] 
Finding 2: Consistent with Hypothesis 2, under the COMPLETE network with a high liquidation 
rate = 0.4 , the efficient, first-best equilibrium outcome where 0 banks other than Bank A are 
bankrupt is more likely to be observed. However, in consistent with Hypothesis 2, when the 
liquidation rate is low, 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2, the financial crisis sometimes becomes global, spreading to all 3 
banks.  
Support for Finding 2 can be seen again in Figure 2, in which the average number of 
bankruptcies in the Compete, 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 treatment is further disaggregated according to whether the 
cohorts coordinated near the efficient (“Good” equilibrium) or the inefficient full contagion (“Bad” 
Equilibrium). Further support for Figure 2 comes from Figures 5-6 which show the number of 
bankrupted banks over time, disaggregated by each of the eleven 8-player cohorts of the Complete 
𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 and Complete 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4 treatments, respectively. 
[Insert Figures 5-6 here] 
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Figure 5 clearly reveals a bifurcated outcome for the Complete 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 treatment, with 5 out 
of 11 cohorts repeatedly experiencing 0 or 1 bankruptcies among banks other than Bank A—a 
“contained” financial crisis—while the other 6 cohorts often experience a complete, or nearly 
complete global financial contagion where all or nearly all banks (other than Bank A) immediately 
become bankrupt. While both pure equilibria are possibilities under the complete network 
structure, our results indicate that complete interbank connectedness and the more efficient risk 
sharing that it allows for, provides no guarantee that agents will coordinate on the efficient (first-
best) outcome when the liquidation rate, 𝑟𝑟 is low. 
By contrast Figure 6 suggests that when the network is Complete and 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4 , the full 
contagion outcome is almost always avoided; the more likely outcome is that 0 or 1 banks other 
than Bank A go bankrupt, so that, consistent with Hypothesis 2, depositors’ behavior is closer to 
the first-best equilibrium outcome in this treatment. 
In addition to considering the aggregate number of bankrupt banks it is also of interest to 
consider the number of withdrawal requests by depositors at individual banks over time to examine 
in further detail how contagions unfold or are contained. Figure 7 shows the mean withdrawal 
decisions by depositors at banks, A, B, C, and D over the 30 rounds of each treatment using 5-
round moving averages of the number of withdrawals made at each of the four banks.  The top two 
panels compare the Incomplete and Complete Networks settings with 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 while the bottom 
two panels do the same for the 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4 case. The middle two panels again separate the Complete, 
𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 treatment into the 5 cohorts that coordinated on the “Good” i.e., First-best equilibrium and 
the 6 that coordinated on the “Bad” i.e., the full contagion equilibrium. 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
Figure 7 clearly reveals that across all treatments, the number of withdrawal requests in Bank 
A is the greatest on average, closely approximating the equilibrium prediction of 2 withdrawals 
(including the one forced withdrawal). The distinction between the number of withdrawal requests 
in Bank A versus Banks B, C, and D is least pronounced in the Incomplete Network 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 
treatment by comparison with the other three treatments, reflecting the fact that the full contagion 
equilibrium was common in that treatment. Indeed, under the Incomplete Network 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4 
treatment and the two Complete network treatments, there is a much clearer separation between 
the number of mean withdrawal requests for Bank A versus the other three banks; the two 
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withdrawal outcome, associated with bankruptcy, is clearly greater for Bank A than for the other 
three banks suggesting that under the complete network structure, and under the incomplete 
network structure with 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4, the contagion is contained to some extent. However, as the middle 
two panels make clear, this distinction is less pronounced in the Complete network 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 
treatment. The separation in the mean withdrawal requests between Bank A and Banks B, C, and 
D is clearly evident in the middle left panel among the 5 cohorts of that treatment for which the 
financial contagion was contained to Bank A. For the other 6 cohorts of the Complete 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 
treatment, as seen in the middle right panel, there is little difference in the mean number of 
withdrawal requests, which are all close to 2 by the final, 30th period (indicating perfect 
bankruptcy). These figures provide additional support for both Findings 1 and 2. 
The 5-round moving averages help to smooth out the effect of the withdrawal requests for each 
round and reveal some differences in the ordering of the number of withdrawals especially in the 
Incomplete 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 treatment relative to the other treatments. In this treatment, a spillover effect 
is observed: the financial shock of Bank A is transmitted to Bank D (which has invested its deposit 
into Bank A). This shock then spreads to Bank C, who has invested in Bank D; and finally, to 
Bank B which has invested in Bank C. There is a clear contagion in the form of spillovers in the 
incomplete market structure, before the crisis becomes global. For the complete network 
treatments, the withdrawal decisions of the other three banks are more coordinated, reflecting the 
completeness and the risk-sharing nature of the network structure in those treatments. 
 
4.2 Average Efficiency across Treatments 
 
In accordance with Findings 1-2, we have the following result regarding efficiency 
comparisons across treatments. 
Finding 3: Average Efficiency is greatest in the two treatments where 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4. For the two 𝑟𝑟 =
0.2  treatments, average efficiency is greater in the Complete network as compared with the 
Incomplete Network. 
Support for Finding 3 comes from Figure 8, which shows average efficiency over the 30 rounds 
of the experiment using data from all 11 cohorts of each of the four treatments. Average efficiency 
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is estimated by averaging the ratio of all depositors’ payoffs to the “bad” equilibrium (i.e., full 
contagion) payoff.  For the Complete, 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2  treatment, we also report average efficiency 
separately for the 5 cohorts that were able to contain the financial contagion and the 6 cohorts of 
the complete network structure for which the contagion was global.  
[Insert Figure 8 here] 
Figure 8 clearly reveals that average efficiency is greatest in the two 𝒓𝒓 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟒𝟒 treatments, 
regardless of the network structure. The Complete, 𝒓𝒓 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟐𝟐 treatment provides the next highest 
average efficiency, followed by the Incomplete, 𝒓𝒓 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟐𝟐 treatment, which has the lowest average 
efficiency of the four treatments.  Focusing on the two 𝒓𝒓 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟐𝟐 treatments, statistically significant 
efficiency differences between the two network structures are only found when comparing average 
efficiency for the 5 cohorts of the Complete Network 𝒓𝒓 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟐𝟐 treatment that avoided the full 
contagion with all eleven cohorts of the Incomplete, 𝒓𝒓 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟐𝟐 treatments7. 
 
4.3 Regression Analysis of Withdrawal Decisions 
 
We next turn to a regression analysis of withdrawal decisions using a mixed effects panel logit 
regression estimator where decisions are analyzed at 3 different levels: Individual, Group and 
Cohort. For this exercise we consider all individual withdrawal decisions, where the subject could 
choose whether or not to withdraw. Thus we exclude the withdrawal decisions of those subjects 
who were assigned to Bank A and who were forced to withdraw; there is 1 such subject in each 8-
subject cohort who fits this description in each round.  Thus, we have data on the voluntary 
withdrawal decisions of 7 subjects per cohort over 30 rounds and we have 44 cohorts in total (11 
of each treatment). This provides us with 𝟕𝟕 × 𝟑𝟑𝟎𝟎 × 𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒 = 𝟗𝟗,𝟐𝟐𝟒𝟒𝟎𝟎  observations on individual 
withdrawal decisions from our experiment.   
The results of our regression exercise are reported in Table 8, where the dependent variable is 
the individual withdrawal decision in each round, with 1 = withdraw early (in period 1), and 0 = 
no withdrawal. We used a mixed effects logit estimator and we report the odds ratios from the 
estimation. We make use of the following explanatory variables: (1) Network Structure Incomplete 
is a dummy variable for choices made under the incomplete network treatment; (2) Liquidation 
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Rate High (0.4) is a dummy variable indicating that 𝒓𝒓 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟒𝟒; (3) Incomplete x Liquidation Rate 
High is an interaction term that multiplies the two previous dummy variables;  (4) Withdraw (if 
not forced) in 𝒕𝒕 − 𝟏𝟏 is the lagged withdrawal decision if the player is not the one in Bank A who 
was forced to withdraw in the previous round; (5) Partner withdraw in 𝒕𝒕 − 𝟏𝟏 is the lagged 
withdrawal decision of the player’s partner if the partner is not the one in Bank A who was forced 
to withdraw in the previous round; (6) Number of withdraws in connected banks in 𝒕𝒕 − 𝟏𝟏 is the 
normalized number of withdrawals in connected banks in the lagged round.8 In addition to these 
economic choice variables, we include a number of control variables making use of the 
demographic data we collected on individual subject characteristics in the survey questionnaire 
administered following the 30th round of play of the main task. These variables include sex, age, 
English language skills and prior experience in economic decision-making (DM) experiments. We 
find that the latter demographic factors have no significant explanatory power on withdrawal 
decisions. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Table 8 reveals several interesting results. First, we observe in our simplest regression model, 
specification 1, that (i) the odds of a withdrawal in the incomplete network treatment with 𝒓𝒓 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟐𝟐 
are significantly larger, specifically 3.5 times greater than in the baseline 𝒓𝒓 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟐𝟐  complete 
network treatment.  This provides evidence that network structure matters in this environment. (ii) 
The odds of a withdrawal in the 𝒓𝒓 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟒𝟒 complete network treatment are 4.978 times lower 
(1/0.201), again relative to the baseline 𝒓𝒓 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟐𝟐 complete network treatment, confirming that the 
liquidation rate, 𝒓𝒓, is also a significant factor in withdrawal decisions. These findings continue to 
hold across all of the other specifications reported in Table 8. These results provide further 
evidence in support of Findings 1 and 2 that the interbank network structure and the liquidation 
rate both matter for the incidence of contagion. 
Second, Table 8 reveals that there is an interaction effect between the network structure and 
the liquidation rate as evidenced by the significant odds ratio for the Incomplete x Liquidation 
Rate High dummy variable. The coefficient from the first specification suggests that the difference 
in the odds of withdrawal when comparing Incomplete versus Complete network structures is 
about 3.4 times (1/0.293) larger when the liquidation rate is low than when it is high. While the 
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coefficient estimate on this interactive dummy variable is only marginally significant, it is 
consistently so across all specifications reported in Table 8.  
We summarize the last findings as follows. 
Finding 4: There is some weak support for Hypothesis 3 that a high liquidation rate reduces the 
effects of network structure on withdrawal decisions.  
Third, Table 8 further reveals that history also matters, as the lagged withdrawal choices by 
the subject, his partner or by depositors in the connected banks all increase the odds that the subject 
chooses to withdraw in the current round. This finding suggests that there is some path dependence 
of withdrawal outcomes that accounts for the withdrawal decisions of cohort members in the 
current round. These results are in line with Garratt and Keister (2009) who find that an 
individual’s history of experience with runs at a single bank matters for their subsequent likelihood 
of withdrawing early.  Our results extend the notion that history matters since withdrawal decisions 
depend not only on the depositors’ history within their own bank, but also on the history of 
outcomes at connected banks.  Nevertheless, even after accounting for this path dependence as is 
done in specifications (3), (5) and (7), the evidence continues to suggest that the network structure 
and the liquidation rate still matter for the frequency of current withdrawal choices.  
 
4.4 Contemporaneous Crisis or a Slow Contagion Effect?  
 
Finally, we consider whether a financial contagion, if it occurs, unfolds in the manner predicted 
by the theory under the two different network structures.  Recall that, under the complete network 
structure, Bank A has interbank connections with the other three banks. Thus, a bankruptcy in 
Bank A has immediate payoff consequences for depositors in all of the other three banks.  If 
depositors in these other banks do not all immediately choose to withdraw, they can achieve the 
first-best equilibrium wherein the financial shock is localized to Bank A. However, if depositors 
believe that enough other non-bank-A depositors will withdraw early, the contagion to all 
depositors withdrawing should occur simultaneously and with the same incidence across all three 
banks. Since all banks are connected under the complete network setup, the number of withdrawals 
in the connected banks represents the number of withdrawals in the entire banking system, so that 
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players have complete system-wide information at the end of each round. By contrast, under the 
incomplete network structure, the bankruptcy of Bank A (if it occurs) has immediate spillover 
effects only to depositors in Bank D, which by design, holds some of its depositors’ deposits in 
Bank A. If Bank D fails, then depositors in Bank C are adversely affected, and if Bank C fails 
depositors in Bank B are adversely affected completing the financial contagion around the 
incomplete network. Because of the incompleteness of the network structure, this financial 
contagion may take some time to unfold and it may well be that distance from and connectedness 
to the source of the financial crisis-- namely Bank A-- matters for the timing of withdrawal 
decisions in repeated play of the game. 
To examine whether network structure matters for the speed with which a contagion unfolds 
we examine the decisions of non-Bank-A depositors to ``wait’’ (i.e., to not withdraw=1) for all 
four treatments. Specifically, we considered the impact of depositors’ distance from bank A on 
their waiting decision. We used the same mixed effects panel logit estimator as in Table 8 to 
examine the waiting choices of non-Bank-A depositors as a function of dummy variables, B, C, 
D, representing their bank membership. The results of this estimation are reported in terms of odds 
ratios in Table 9.    
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Table 9 reveals that for the incomplete network 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 treatment (i.e., Incomplete – Low LR), 
the odds of waiting are different across the three banks. Indeed, a Wald test of the hypotheses that 
these odds ratios are equal between banks D and C, banks C and B, and banks D and B is easily 
rejected (Prob > χ
2 
  < 0.05 for all three pairwise comparisons) in favour of the alternative that the 
odds of waiting are lower the closer is the connection to Bank A (the baseline). In particular, the 
order of waiting odds across the three banks is 𝐷𝐷 < 𝐶𝐶 < 𝐵𝐵 . This pattern is consistent with a 
behavioural bias favouring (against) early withdrawal the more (less) directly connected the bank 
is to the source of the financial crisis, namely Bank A.  
Conversely, for the complete network treatments (both Low and High LR) and the Incomplete 
𝑟𝑟 = 0.4 treatment, the odds ratios are not significantly different from one another across the three 
banks; (Wald Test Prob > χ
2 
  > 0.10 in all three pairwise comparisons) and are higher than in the 
incomplete Low LR treatment.  The lack of a difference in the odds ratios across the three banks 
is consistent with the theoretical prediction that a contagion, if it happens, does so instantaneously 
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across all four banks in the economy. The lower odds of waiting in the incomplete 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 
treatment relative to the other three treatments simply reflects the finding that financial contagions 
always occur under the incomplete network 𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 structure, but occur less frequently under the 
complete network structure or in the incomplete network structure when 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4 We summarize 
the results from Table 9 as follows: 
Finding 5: While theory predicts that a financial contagion, if it occurs, spreads to all banks 
immediately in period 1, in the experiment we find that the contagion is slower to unfold in the 
incomplete network structure where the liquidation cost is high (i.e., LR low) and the timing of 
depositors’ decisions to wait/withdraw depends on the distance of their bank from the source of 
the financial crisis (Bank A). 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
    Modern banking systems involve many connections across banks (and non-banks) e.g., for risk 
management and payment processing reasons.  Thus, it is not surprising that modern financial 
crises will potentially have contagion effects with spillovers from one bank to another. In this 
paper we report on the first experiment exploring the role of interbank network structure for the 
incidence of financial contagion. Consistent with the theoretical framework of Allen and Gale 
(2000) that we implement and test in the laboratory we find that financial contagions are common 
under incomplete network structures in cases where efficient risk sharing is not possible and 
liquidation rates are low. We further find that when efficient risk sharing is possible under a 
complete interbank network structure or if liquidation rates are high in an incomplete network, 
financial contagions can sometimes be contained. However, we also find that financial contagions 
continue to be a possibility even under the complete interbank network structure. Thus, an 
important implication of our results is that while more complete interbank network structures may 
reduce the incidence of financial contagions by facilitating more efficient risk sharing among 
banks, such complete network structures are not a panacea for preventing such contagions. Indeed, 
our experiment suggests that a more promising approach to reducing the frequency of contagions 
is to raise the liquidation rate (equivalently lower the liquidation costs in the event of bankruptcy).  
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There are several directions for future research on this topic. First, we have considered a setting 
with the minimal number of banks needed to examine network interaction effects (4).  It would be 
of interest to consider larger networks of banks in combination with further variations in network 
structures. In particular, it would be of interest to consider more realistic asymmetric interbank 
network structures where different banks have differing numbers of interbank network connections 
that could be determined according to existing, real-world interbank network structures. Indeed, 
this approach has been pursued in a recent paper by Choi et al. (2017). 
Second, an implication of our last Finding 5 is that there may be some value to modeling 
financial contagion among interconnected banks in incomplete network environments using an 
explicitly dynamic game approach as opposed to the static, simultaneous-game approach that is 
used in our experiment based on the model of Allen and Gale (2000). We leave these extensions 




A.1 Printed Instructions: Incomplete Network Structure, r=0.2 (Instructions for r=0.4 are Similar) 
 
Instructions 
  Welcome to this experiment in economic decision-making. Please pay careful attention to 
these instructions as they explain how you earn money from the decisions that you make. After we 
read the instructions, please raise your hand if you have any questions. An experimenter will go to 
your desk and answer your question in private.   
During today's session, your payoffs will be in terms of an experimental currency called 
“experimental pounds”, in short EP. At the end of the experiment, this experimental currency will 
be converted into British pounds. The amount you earn in this experiment will depend on the 
decisions that you and other participants make. Your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the 
end of the experiment. In addition, you will receive £3 for taking part in the experiment. 
Please do not talk with others during the session and make sure you have silenced any mobile 
devices.  
Description of the task 
In this experiment, you will be part of a cohort of 8 participants. The other 7 participants in your 
cohort can be anyone in this room. Each participant will take on the role of a depositor who has 
his or her deposits with an experimental ‘bank’. There are 4 banks, named A, B, C and D. You and 
the other 7 participants will be divided up into 4 groups (2 participants in each group). You will 
remain in the same group of two and the same cohort for the entire experiment.  
The experiment consists of 30 rounds, and in each round your group will be randomly assigned 
to one of the four banks. At the beginning of each round you and your group-mate will be informed 
about the bank to which you have been assigned. 
At the beginning of each round you and the 7 other persons automatically deposit 100 EP in the 
bank to which you have been assigned. You must decide whether to withdraw your funds, or to 
wait and leave your funds deposited with your bank.   
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In each round one depositor assigned to bank ‘A’ (and bank ‘A’ only) will be randomly chosen 
and forced to withdraw.  Both depositors in bank ‘A’ have an equal chance of being selected and 
forced to withdraw. If you have been assigned to bank ‘A’, then you will be informed about 
whether you have been selected and forced to withdraw. If this is the case, the computer will 
automatically select the action ‘withdraw’ for you. Every other depositor will need to decide 
whether to withdraw their funds, or to wait and leave them deposited in their bank. 





Specifically, banks ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D’ are partially connected. Banks are said to be connected 
to the bank in which they invest part of their deposits. The arrows in the figure display the direction 
the investment takes place. Here, bank ‘A’ invests in bank ‘B’, which invests in bank ‘C’, which 
invests in bank ‘D’ which in turn invests in bank ‘A’.  So, bank ‘A’ is connected to bank ‘B’; bank 
‘B’ is connected to bank ‘C’; and so on. This means that your payoffs depend on your own 
decision, the decisions of your group-mate, and the decisions of the people in the bank you are 
connected with. Specifically, how much you earn or lose if you make a withdrawal request or how 
much you earn or lose by leaving your money deposited in the bank depends on whether your 
group-mate places a withdrawal request and on how many people in the other bank you are 
connected with place withdrawal requests. To facilitate your decision, the payoff table below 
shows the payoffs, that is, the earnings or losses you incur on your 100 EP deposit. The payoff 
table lists the payoffs that you can obtain depending on your choice, the choice of the other person 
in your bank, and the choice of the people in the bank you are connected with. Note in the table 
below that ‘N’ stands for ‘not withdraw’ and ‘W’ stands for withdraw for your choice and the 
choice of your group-mate. The number of withdrawals in the other, connected bank can be `0W’, 
`1W’, or `2W’ which stand for 0, 1, or 2 person(s) withdrawing, respectively. Remember that in 
bank ‘A’ one person is forced to withdraw, so if you are in that bank and you are not forced to 





relevant to you. Also, if you are a depositor in bank ‘D’, the two columns that correspond to zero 
withdrawal requests, `0W’, in the connected bank are not relevant to you.  
 
 Choice of your group-mate N W 
 
Number of withdrawals in 
the connected bank 
0W 1W 2W 0W 1W 2W 
Your 
Choice 
N 100 -4 -83 -100 -100 -100 
W -15 -20 -24 -32 -36 -39 
 
Note that since you cannot communicate with others, you must guess what other people will do  
– whether your group-mate will withdraw (if you are not in bank ‘A’) and how many of the people 
in bank you are connected with will withdraw (if any) - and act accordingly. 
Procedure  
    You will perform the task described above 30 times. Each time is called a round. Each round is 
completely independent, i.e., you start each round with 100 EP in the bank. At the end of each 
round, the computer screen will show you your decision and your payoffs for that round. 
Information for earlier rounds is also provided.   
Computer instructions  
You will see three types of screens: the decision screen, the payoff screen and the waiting 
screen. Your withdrawal decisions will be made on the decision screen as shown in Figure 1. You 
can choose to withdraw your funds or leave your funds in the bank by clicking the corresponding 
option. Note that your decision will be final once you press the ‘Confirm’ button. The header 
provides information about what round you are in and the time remaining to make a decision. After 




Figure 1: The decision screen 
 
    After all participants enter their decisions, a payoff screen will appear as shown in Figure 2. 
You will see your decision and payoffs for the current round. The history of your decisions, the 
decisions of your group-mate, the decisions of people in the connected bank and your payoffs is 
also provided. After you have finished reading this information, click on the “Continue” button to 






Figure 2: The payoff screen 
 
You might see a waiting screen (as shown in Figure 3) following the decision or payoff screens. 
This means that other people are still making decisions or reading information on the outcome of 
a round and you will need to wait until they finish to go on to the next step. 
 




   Once you have completed the 30 rounds the computer program will randomly select 1 round. 
The payoff (earnings/losses) in the selected round will be added to your deposit of 100EP and 
transformed into British pounds using the following formula: 
[100 EP + Payoff (in EP)] × 0.1 
Also, the participation fee will be added to calculate your final earnings. This information will be 
summarized in your computer screen. After this, you will be asked to answer a short questionnaire. 
In the meantime, the experimenter will prepare your payment. After all participants finish the 
questionnaire, the experimenter will call you one by one to the payment desk where you will 
receive your payment in cash. 
You may now click start. Before starting we will ask you to complete a comprehension quiz in 
order to make sure that you understood the instructions. After completing the quiz, you will start 
round 1.  
 
[Are there any questions?] 
 
A.2 Printed Instructions: Complete Network Structure, r=0.2 (Instructions for r=0.4 are Similar) 
Instructions 
  Welcome to this experiment in economic decision-making. Please pay careful attention to 
these instructions as they explain how you earn money from the decisions that you make. After we 
read the instructions, please raise your hand if you have any questions. An experimenter will go to 
your desk and answer your question in private.   
During today's session, your payoffs will be in terms of an experimental currency called 
“experimental pounds”, in short EP. At the end of the experiment, this experimental currency will 
be converted into British pounds. The amount you earn in this experiment will depend on the 
decisions that you and other participants make. Your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the 
end of the experiment. In addition, you will receive £3 for taking part in the experiment. 




Description of the task 
In this experiment, you will be part of a cohort of 8 participants. The other 7 participants in your 
cohort can be anyone in this room. Each participant will take on the role of a depositor who has 
his or her deposit with an experimental ‘bank’. There are 4 banks, named A, B, C and D. You and 
the other 7 participants will be divided up into 4 groups (2 participants in each group). You will 
remain in the same group of two and the same cohort for the entire experiment.  
The experiment consists of 30 rounds, and in each round your group will be randomly assigned 
to one of the four banks. At the beginning of each round you and your group-mate will be informed 
about the bank to which you have been assigned. 
At the beginning of each round you and the 7 other persons automatically deposit 100 EP in the 
bank to which you have been assigned. You must decide whether to withdraw your funds, or to 
wait and leave your funds deposited with your bank.   
In each round one depositor assigned to bank ‘A’ (and bank ‘A’ only) will be randomly chosen 
and forced to withdraw.  Both depositors in bank ‘A’ have an equal chance of being selected and 
forced to withdraw. If you have been assigned to bank ‘A’, then you will be informed about 
whether you have been selected and forced to withdraw. If this is the case, the computer will 
automatically select the action ‘withdraw’ for you. Every other depositor will need to decide 
whether to withdraw their funds, or to wait and leave them deposited in their bank. 





Specifically, banks ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D’ are fully connected. When banks are connected it 
implies that they invest part of their deposits in the banks they are connected with.  The arrows in 
the figure display the direction the investment takes place.  Here, all banks invest in all other banks. 
This means that your payoffs depend on your own decision, the decisions of the other people in 





much you earn or lose if you make a withdrawal request or how much you earn or lose by leaving 
your money deposited in the bank depends on whether your group-mate places a withdrawal 
request and on how many people in the other three banks you are connected with place withdrawal 
requests. To facilitate your decision, the payoff table below shows the payoffs that is the earnings 
or losses you incur on your 100 EP deposit. The payoff table lists the payoffs that you can obtain 
depending on your choice, the choice of the other person in your bank, and the choice of the people 
in the banks you are connected with.  Note, in the table below ‘N’ stands for ‘not withdraw’, ‘W’ 
stands for withdraw for your choice and the choice of your group-mate.  The number of 
withdrawals in the other, three connected banks can be `0W’ ‘1W’, ‘2W’, ‘3W, ‘4W’, ‘5W’ and 
‘6W’ which stand for 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or all 6 person(s) withdrawing respectively. Remember that 
in bank ‘A’ one person is forced to withdraw, so if you are in that bank and you are not forced to 
withdraw, the column corresponding to no withdrawal request, `N’, by your group-mate is not 
relevant to you. And if you are a depositor in bank ‘B’, ‘C’, or ‘D’, the columns corresponding to 
zero withdrawal requests in the connected banks are not relevant. 
 
     
    Note that since you cannot communicate with others, you must guess what other people will do  
– whether your group-mate will withdraw (if you are not in bank ‘A’) and how many of the people 













0W 1W 2W 3W 4W 5W 6W 0W 1W 2W 3W 4W 5W 6W 
Your 
Choice 
N 100 67 25 -18 -77 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 




    You will perform the task described above 30 times. Each time is called a round. Each round is 
completely independent, i.e., you start each round with 100 EP in the bank. At the end of each 
round, the computer screen will show you your decision and your payoffs for that round. 
Information for earlier rounds is also provided.   
Computer instructions  
You will see three types of screens: the decision screen, the payoff screen and the waiting 
screen. Your withdrawal decisions will be made on the decision screen as shown in Figure 1. You 
can choose to withdraw your funds or leave your funds in the bank by clicking the corresponding 
option. Note that your decision will be final once you press the ‘Confirm’ button. The header 
provides information about what round you are in and the time remaining to make a decision. After 
the time limit is reached, you will be given a flashing reminder “please reach a decision!”  
 
Figure 1: The decision screen 
 
    After all participants enter their decisions, a payoff screen will appear as shown in Figure 2. 
You will see your decision and payoffs for the current round. The history of your decisions, the 
decisions of your group-mate, the decisions of people in the connected banks and your payoffs is 
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also provided. After you have finished reading this information, click on the “Continue” button to 
go on to the next round. You will have up to 15 seconds to review the information before a new 
round begins. 
 
Figure 2: The payoff screen 
You might see a waiting screen (as shown in Figure 3) following the decision or payoff screens. 
This means that other people are still making decisions or reading information on the outcome of 
a round and you will need to wait until they finish to go on to the next step. 
 





   Once you have completed the 30 rounds the computer program will randomly select 1 round. 
The payoff (earnings/losses) in the selected round will be added to your deposit of 100 EP and 
transformed into British pounds using the following formula: 
[100 EP + Payoff (in EP)] × 0.1 
Also, the participation fee will be added to calculate your final earnings. This information will be 
summarized in your computer screen. After this, you will be asked to answer a short questionnaire. 
In the meantime, the experimenter will prepare your payment. After all participants finish the 
questionnaire, the experimenter will call you one by one to the payment desk where you will 
receive your payment in cash. 
You may now click start. Before starting we will ask you to complete a comprehension quiz in 
order to make sure that you understood the instructions. After completing the quiz, you will start 
round 1.  
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1 See Dufwenberg (2015) for a recent survey of the literature. 
2 Other differences between the papers include the number of withdrawers in each bank, strategic 
uncertainty regarding types, and the number of repetitions of the game. 
3 Corbae and Duffy (2008) study the role of network structure for equilibrium selection in N-player 
Stag Hunt games but their main focus is on the endogenous choice of network structure. By 
contrast, in this paper we impose the network structures exogenously and ask whether those 
different structures matter for the prevalence of efficient risk sharing.   
4 See Allen and Gale (2000) for a detailed description on how to get these first-best allocations. 
5 This was computerized and the subjects’ endowments were automatically deposited in their 
respective bank. As noted earlier, deposits were invested by the bank so as to achieve the first best 
outcome; these choices are reflected in the payoff tables that subjects face when considering 
whether to make withdrawal decisions. 
6 For example, given that there are 4 banks, there can be 4 different combinations where only 1 
person withdraws in the entire banking system. The payoffs for each bank if one person withdraws 
might differ due to the asymmetry in the forced withdrawal request in Bank A. For this reason, we 
calculate the median value of those 4 payoffs and this is what appears, for instance under the N, 
1W column of Table 4. The payoff tables for all possible combinations of withdrawal demands are 
available upon request.  
7  95% confidence interval bars were added to the different average efficiency time series to 
conclude about statistical differences.  However, for presentation purposes, we do not present these 
confidence interval bars in Figure 8.  
8 Recall that in the complete network for any bank, the number of connected banks is three while 
in the incomplete network it is one, therefore in the complete network the maximum number of 
withdrawals in the connected banks is six whereas in the incomplete network it is two. To make 
treatments comparable, we used a unity-based normalization, that is: 𝑟𝑟′ = 𝑟𝑟−min (𝑟𝑟)
max(𝑟𝑟)−min (𝑟𝑟)
 , where 
𝑟𝑟 is the observed number of withdrawals in the connected banks. 
 
 






 A B C D 
𝑺𝑺𝟏𝟏 𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 
𝑺𝑺𝟐𝟐 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 





 A B C D 
𝑆𝑆̅ 𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀 𝛾𝛾 𝛾𝛾 𝛾𝛾 





  Liquidation Rate 
  𝑟𝑟 = 0.2 𝑟𝑟 = 0.4 
Network Structure 
Complete FB, FC FB, FC 
Incomplete FC FB, FC 






 Choice of your group-mate N W 
 Number of Withdrawals in the connected bank N 1W 2W N 1W 2W 
Your 
Choice 
N 100 -4 -83 -100 -100 -100 
W -15 -20 -24 -32 -36 -39 




 Choice of your group-mate N W 
 Number of Withdrawals in the connected bank N 1W 2W N 1W 2W 
Your 
Choice 
N 100 81 34 -100 -100 -100 
W -5 -7 -12 -24 -26 -29 











0W 1W 2W 3W 4W 5W 6W 0W 1W 2W 3W 4W 5W 6W 
Your 
Choice 
N 100 67 25 -18 -77 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 
W -13 -15 -17 -19 -22 -24 -26 -29 -31 -33 -34 -37 -38 -40 











0W 1W 2W 3W 4W 5W 6W 0W 1W 2W 3W 4W 5W 6W 
Your 
Choice 
N 100 94 88 63 51 25 0 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 
W -4 -5 -6 -8 -9 -12 -14 -22 -22 -23 -25 -26 -28 -30 





Notes: Dependent variable: “withdraw=1”. Mixed-effects panel logistic regression, Three levels: 
Cohort (N=44)-group (N=176)-individual (N=352). Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01,   
* p<0.05. 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio
Network Structure Incomplete = 1 3.498** 3.462** 3.279** 3.260** 3.137** 3.118** 2.790** 2.773**
(1.657) (1.629) (1.457) (1.438) (1.343) (1.325) (1.071) (1.056)
Liquidation Rate High (0.4) = 1  0.201** 0.202** 0.224** 0.226** 0.240** 0.241** 0.285** 0.287**
(0.0950) (0.0946) (0.0992) (0.0991) (0.102) (0.102) (0.109) (0.109)
Incomplete x  Liquidation Rate High 0.293 0.301 0.310 0.312 0.324 0.326 0.356 0.359
(0.196) (0.200) (0.194) (0.194) (0.196) (0.196) (0.193) (0.193)
Withdraw (if not forced) in t-1 1.650** 1.650** 1.455** 1.456** 1.447** 1.448**
(0.119) (0.119) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110)
Partner withdraw in t-1 1.504** 1.501** 1.569** 1.567**
(0.113) (0.112) (0.118) (0.118)
Number of  withdrawals in 1.986** 1.985**
connected banks in t-1  (normalized) (0.214) (0.214)
if sex = Female 1.151 1.172 1.176 1.178
(0.138) (0.125) (0.134) (0.136)
Age (years) 0.985 0.987 0.986 0.987
(0.0120) (0.0107) (0.0114) (0.0116)
If native language not English 0.953 1.028 1.020 1.019
(0.131) (0.126) (0.133) (0.134)
Experience  in DM Experiments 1.002 0.997 0.997 0.998
(0.0154) (0.0138) (0.0146) (0.0148)
Constant 1.504 1.192 1.022 0.660
(0.638) (0.464) (0.400) (0.249)
Observations 9,240 9,240 7,834 7,834 7,834 7,834 7,834 7,834




Note: Dependent variable “wait=1”. Three levels: Cohort (N=44)-group (N=176)-individual 
(N=352). Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 









(2.011) (3.958) (16.91) (16.34)
C
(1.406) (4.208) (18.11) (15.83)
D
(0.890) (3.944) (11.71) (12.42)
Constant
(0.0135) (0.0254) (0.0358) (0.0327)
Observations
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I - 0.4 C - 0.4 I - 0.2
C - 0.2 C - 0.2 Good Equilibrium C - 0.2 Bad Equilibrium


















Figure 3: Number of Bankrupted Banks (excluding Bank "A") over time, each cohort of the 








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Cohort 12 Cohort 13 Cohort 14 Cohort 15 Cohort 16 Cohort 17
























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Cohort 34 Cohort 35 Cohort 36 Cohort 37 Cohort 38 Cohort 39
Cohort 40 Cohort 41 Cohort 42 Cohort 43 Cohort 44
Figure 4: Number of Bankrupted Banks (excluding Bank "A") over time, each cohort of the 
























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 Cohort 5 Cohort 6
Cohort 7 Cohort 8 Cohort 9 Cohort 10 Cohort 11
Figure 5: Number of Bankrupted Banks (excluding Bank "A") over time, each cohort of the Complete, 























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Cohort 23 Cohort 24 Cohort 25 Cohort 26 Cohort 27 Cohort 28
Cohort 29 Cohort 30 Cohort 31 Cohort 32 Cohort 33
Figure 6: Number of Bankrupted Banks (excluding Bank "A") over time, each cohort of the 






























5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29






5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930






5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930






5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930







5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930







5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930






5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930
Treatment: Incomplete - r = 0.4
Figure 7: Number of Withdrawal decisions by banks in various treatments/cohorts over time  












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
I - 0.4 C - 0.4 I - 0.2 C - 0.2 C - 0.2 Good Equilibrium C - 0.2 Bad Equilibrium
Figure 8: Average Efficiency over time, all four treatments. The Complete, 𝒓𝒓 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟐𝟐 treatment is 
subdivided into cohorts closer to the good or to the bad equilibria of the model. 
